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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 18

RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES OF GOVERNMENT
SAVINGS BONDS
In 1939 the Washington Court in Decker v. Fowler virtually eliminated the effect of the beneficiary provision in government savings
bonds by holding that beneficiaries named in the bonds have no right
to the proceeds on the death of the purchaser unless there has been a
valid inter vivos gift of the bond between the purchaser and the beneficiary.1 The majority of the court apparently failed to recognize that
there was a donee beneficiary contract entered into between the purchaser and the government.2 In two subsequent Washington cases,
where the court has found a contract relation in somewhat analogous
situations, Decker v. Fowler has been specifically distinguished as not
involving a contract problem.3 Thus the court has adhered to its position in the Decker case with the inevitable result of confusion as to
the rights of beneficiaries of government savings bonds.
The question regarding the beneficiary's rights has also arisen in
other jurisdictions and in at least one of them, New York, Decker v.
Fowler has been cited with approval. 4 The New York court has added
an additional element to the problem, however, by stigmatizing the
beneficiary provision as a violation of the Statute of Wills. On the
other hand, decisions directly contrary to that of the Washington
Court have been handed down by three other courts. 5 Two of them, the
Court of Claims, and the New Jersey Equity Court, have specifically
found that the bonds entail a donee beneficiary relation, while the
third, the Colorado Supreme Court, has based its decision solely on
the ground that the bonds are authorized by Congressional action and
text of the "War Labor Disputes Act," as it is now titled, see 12 LRR 599.
For the text of President Roosevelt's veto message, see, Passage of War
Labor Disputes Act, 12 LRR 632. Despite President Roosevelt's opinion, expressed in his veto message, that the law would encourage strikes and
cause some which would otherwise not occur, both chambers of Congress.
within a few minutes after receipt of the veto message, on June 25th, voted
to override.
For a discussion of the numerous problems concerning the scope and
applicability and manner of enforcement of the Act, see, Questions Foreshadowed by Anti-Strike Act, 12 LRR 669.
LRR Analysis, July 5, 1943, discusses enforcement techniques under the
War Disputes Act.
' Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549, 92 P. (2d) 254, 131 A. L. R. 967 (1939).
2
See criticism of the case: Warren L. Shattuck, Donee BeneficiaryDecker v. Fowler, 14 WAsH. LAw REv. 312.
3 In re Lewis' Estate, 2 Wn. (2d) 467, 98 P. (2d) 654 (1940): provision
in deed cancelling the accompanying mortgage if the deed was not fully
paid for by the vendor's death was held a valid contract between vendor
and vendee. In re Iver's Estate, 4 Wn. (2d) 458, 104 P. (2d) 467 (1940):
joint bank account with the right of survivorship held not a testamentary
disposition.
4In
re Karlinski's Estate, 38 N. Y. S. (2nd) 297 (1942); Devo v. Adams,
178 Misc. 859, 36 N.Y. S. (2d) 734 (1942); see also, 56 Hav. LAw REv. 1007
(May, 1943).
rWarren v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 634 (1929); Franklin Washington
Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N. J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854 (1943); In re Stanley's
Estate, 102 Colo. 422, 80 P. (2d) 332 (1938).
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therefore should have the supremacy afforded Federal law.6 Realizing
the difficulties which will arise in a confusion of state decisions on
the Federal government has intervened in the Karlinski
the problem,
7
ca"se.
The confusion in Washington as to government savings bonds
has now fortunately been clarified by the legislature. An act affirming
the beneficiary's rights was passed in the 1943 session. It provides:
"§ 1: If either co-owner of United States Savings Bonds
registered in two names as co-owners (in the alternative) dies
without having presented and surrendered the bond for payment to a Federal Reserve Bank or the Treasury Department,
the surviving co-owner will be the sole and absolute owner of
the bond.
"§ 2: If the registered owner of United States Savings
Bonds registered in the name of one person payable on death
to another dies without having presented and surrendered the
bond for payment or authorized re-issue to a Federal Reserve
Bank or Treasury Department, and is survived by the beneifciary, the beneficiary will be the sole and absolute owner
of the bond."
Although this enactment has solved the problem as to government
bonds, the rights of beneficiaries of life insurance policies and savings
deposit trusts are still uncertain. 9 It is necessary to recognize a contract relation in the Decker case, as the court did in the Iver and Lewis
cases in order to have a clear precedent for further cases involving
the rights of contract beneficiaries. 10
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SALES TAX-APPIaCAB5rrY TO CoarrmoNAL SALES. Held: Where property
sold under a conditional sales contract is repossessed by the vendor after
part payment, the sales tax is to be computed on the full amount of the
sale, and is not limited to the amounts actually collected thereunder. The
sales tax is payable on the full consideration, and money, credits, rights
or chattel given as part of the purchase price are not exempt from the
tax. Olympic Motors v. McCroslcej, 115 Wash. Dec. 562, 132 P. (2d) 355
(1942).
Plaintiff sold motor vehicles on conditional sales contracts, under which
it repossessed a number of them. In making its regular report to the
state tax commission, plaintiff paid the sales tax upon the amount of the
conditional sales after deducting therefrom the unpaid balances due upon
the conditional sales contracts under which it had repossessed vehicles.
6

As to 'the policy favoring supremacy of Federal obligations, see:
Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, op. cit. supra, n. 5; Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 63 Sup. Ct. 573 (1943): Federal common law
determined liability of endorser of treasury check; Gulf Oil Co. v. Lastrap,
48 F. Supp. 947 (S. D., Tex. 1943): beneficiary allowed to recover in insurance policy though he had no insurable interest by state law.
'7Rhearing, In re Karlinski's Estate, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 22 (March, 1943).
8 Ch. 14, SEssioN LAWS, 1943,
DVance, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930), p. 545; 14 WASH. LAW Puv. 312, n. 2,
op. cit., supra, n. 2; 1 Scott, TRUSTS (1939), § 58.3; 56 HARV. LAW PuV. 1007
(May,
10 1943).
S

Op. cit., sLpra, n. 3.

